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ETHICAL FINANCE AS A SYSTEMIC
CHALLENGE: RISK, CULTURE,
AND STRUCTURE
Saule T. Omarova*
In recent years, there has been no shortage of scandals involving
fraudulent,predatory, and otherwise ethically unacceptable behavior on
the part of large U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions.Reverse redlining and targeting of racial minorities and other vulnerable segments of
the population for subprime mortgages, collusive price-fixing in the
world's most important interbank lending and trading markets, and
fraudulent creation of client accounts by bank employees pressured to
generatefees for the bank are only some of the recent examples of such
blatantly unethical behavior. Much of this behavior was also directly
implicated in the generation of unsustainable levels of risk in the financial system, which led to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.
Not surprisingly, industry regulatorsand scholars offinancial markets have been increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the financial industry's systematic failure to maintain high ethical standardsof business
conduct. Much of the regulators' and academics' attention in this area is
focused on individualfinancial institutions' apparent inability to foster a
strong internal culture of pursuing market objectives through ethical and
socially responsible means. Accordingly, the potential remedy for this
problem is often seen as a matter of improving the firms' culture of risktaking, so that they develop a genuine commitment to seek private gains
without creating systemically destabilizing risks or otherwise endangering the well-being of their clients, creditors,and the rest of the society. In
effect, this recent "ethics turn" in financial regulation recasts firms'
"risk culture" as a crucial determinantof success, orfailure, of the postcrisis searchfor systemic financial stability.
This Article analyzes the principal themes in the newly reinvigorated public debate on the role of ethical norms and culturalfactors in
financialmarkets and identifies its key conceptual and normative limitations. It argues that the principalflaw in that debate is that it tends to
ignore the critical role of systemic, structuralfactors in shaping individual firms' internal cultural norms and attitudes toward legitimate busi* Professor of Law at Cornell University Law School. For thoughtful comments and
criticisms, I thank the organizers of and participants in the joint Cornell University and Tel
Aviv University conference "The Ethical Challenges of the Market" (Oct. 5-6, 2017).
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ness conduct. Reversing the causality assumption underlying the current
academic and policy discourse on institutional culture, the Article discusses how broader reform measures seeking to alter the fundamental
structure and dynamics of the financial market-on a macro- ratherthan
micro- level-would profoundly, andfar more effectively, alter individuals' and firms' normative choices and attitudes. The key to making finance ethically sound, therefore, is to make it structurallysound - and to
do so on a systemic level.
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"[Improving culture in the financial services industry is an imperative. This endeavor is important in
order to ensure financial stability over time, but also to
ensure the public trust in our financial system. "1
1 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive of the Fed. Res. Bank. N.Y., Re-

marks at the Workshop on Improving Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry,
Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct.
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"Ethical problems in organizations originate not
with 'a few bad apples' but with the 'barrelmakers'. ",2
INTRODUCTION

The global financial crisis of 2008 has underscored the urgent need
to rethink how financial firms ought to manage risk, and do so not only
for the sake of generating good results for themselves and their clients
but also for the sake of keeping the entire financial and economic system
from collapse. The most immediate and recognizable manifestation of
this attitudinal shift is the explicit focus of post-crisis legal and regulatory reforms on systemic, as opposed to entity-level or purely bilateral,
implications of financial institutions' business activities. In the aftermath
of the crisis, law-makers and regulators around the globe embraced the
goal of safeguarding systemic financial stability as their core responsibility and, accordingly, adopted an overtly macroprudential approach to
overseeing financial firms' operations. 3 In practice, this shift manifested
itself in the promulgation of various new-or newly strengthenedmandatory limits on financial institutions' ability to incur leverage, make
high-risk proprietary trades, or otherwise increase the vulnerability of the
4
financial system to potentially contagious shocks.
In recent years, however, U.S. and global financial regulators deliberately expanded their focus beyond traditional rule-making and embarked on a coordinated campaign to improve the ethical standards of
business conduct and the internal culture of prudent risk-taking in the
financial services industry. It has long been recognized that bankers' attitudes and actions are shaped not only by the "explicit" force of externally
imposed laws and regulations but also by the "implicit codes of conduct"
that exist within their firms. 5 In a canonical essay written more than
thirty years ago, Gerald Corrigan argued that, in exchange for the publicly-conferred benefits uniquely available to them, banks have an obligation to align their implicit codes-and their actual conduct-with the
20, 2014), (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/
dudl4lO2Oa.html).
2 James O'Toole & Warren Bennis, What's Needed Next: A Culture of Candor, 87(6)
H~av. Bus. REv., Jun. 2009, at 54.
3 For in-depth analyses of the post-crisis shift to macroprudential regulation, see, e.g.,
Robert Hockett, The MacroprudentialTurn: From Institutional 'Safety and Soundness' to Systematic 'FinancialStability' in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 201 (2015);
Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, MacroprudentialPolicy-A Literature Review (Bank

for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, 2011), www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf; Int'l
Monetary Fund, MacroprudentialPolicy: An OrganizingFramework (2011), https://www.iif
.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2011/031411 .pdf.
4 Id.
5 E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? FED. REs. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Ar'NuAL
REPORT (1983).
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public good. 6 In practice, however, there has been little evidence of such
an alignment. To the contrary, the events of the last decade revealed pervasive patterns of corrupt behavior and systematic indifference to the
public costs of excessive risk-taking on the part of large financial
7
institutions.
This fundamentally anti-social behavior was put on full display, for
example, when the post-crisis congressional investigation uncovered and
documented numerous cases of financial institutions' conscious disregard for, and often deliberate concealment of, unacceptably high risks
built into subprime mortgage loans they originated, packaged, and sold to
investors. 8 One of the most troubling revelations in this respect was that,
in the vast majority of these cases, banks' and their employees' socially
harmful and ethically questionable business conduct was perfectly permissible under the existing legal rules. In each of those instances, bankers voluntarily, and often knowingly, chose to pursue a particular
privately lucrative but socially suboptimal business strategy. And, as
long as mortgage markets kept going up and speculative trading in mortgage assets remained profitable, bankers showed no interest in fulfilling
their public duties or prioritizing moral values over pecuniary selfinterest.
Against that background, the recent launch of a deliberately coordinated and publicized regulatory campaign to "improve culture" in the
financial services industry represents a logical extension of post-crisis
reforms aimed at bolstering the resilience and stability of the financial
system. More broadly, however, it signals regulators' resolve to elevate
the significance of ethical considerations and cultural norms as levers of
socially desirable change in the financial marketplace. Not surprisingly,
scholars, policy commentators, and industry experts differ in their assessments of the potential efficacy of this "ethics and culture" turn in financial regulation. Some enthusiastically embrace this moment of regulatory
"softening" as consistent with the financial industry's enlightened selfinterest. Others express varying degrees of skepticism with respect to
regulators' ability to translate their moral exhortations into actionable
guidance for financial institutions' and professionals' business conduct.
In any event, this latest regulatory turn has spurred a new wave of writing and thinking about the role of ethics and culture in modem finance. 9

6

Id.

7 See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
8 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,

112TH

CONG., WALL STREET

AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FNANcIAL COLLAPSE (Comm. Print 2011), http://

hsgac.senate.gov/public/-files/FinancialCrisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.
9 See infra Part III.
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The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it attempts to survey
the principal themes in the newly reinvigorated public debate on the role
of ethical norms and cultural factors in financial markets and to identify
key conceptual and normative limitations of that debate. Second, the Article seeks to push the debate beyond its current limits by shifting the
focus away from the predominantly individual entity-level analysis toward the broader systemic dynamics of modern finance.
Mapping out the principal themes in the current debate on the ethics
and culture in the financial services industry is an important analytical
exercise, especially because that debate is so wide-ranging as to appear
lacking in coherence. This exercise brings into relief the post-crisis shift
in our collective understanding of how various cultural factors fit into
and shape the dynamics in the financial sector. It also yields several important insights into what is missing from the conversation, and why
"improving culture" of finance in practice remains such a frustratingly
elusive task. The Article argues that, for all its richness, the current debate is not able to generate a cohesive and workable solution, to a great
extent, because it operates on the basis of a fundamental misdiagnosis of
the problem as a micro-level phenomenon. The principal focus of academic and policy discussions is on an individual financial services firm,
a discrete corporate entity whose organizational culture constitutes the
primary object of proposed reforms. It is implicitly assumed that "correcting" the norms and attitudes toward risk-taking within individual financial firms would automatically improve both the industry-wide risk
culture and the long-term stability of the financial system.' 0
The Article challenges this paradigm and offers an alternative,
macro-structural approach to reforming the culture of risk-taking in the
financial sector. As argued below, individual firms are not free agents
exercising their morally salient organizational choices in a vacuum.
These firms are interconnected elements of a bigger whole-the market,
the industry, the financial system, the economy at large-and their individual (or micro-level) choices and strategies reflect certain fundamentally collective (or macro-level) choices and strategies. Each firm
continuously absorbs, processes, operationalizes, and hierarchically orders specific norms and responds to specific incentives generated within
these surrounding institutional layers. Accordingly, a meaningful change
in the culture and practice of risk-taking at the level of a financial services firm requires, first and foremost, a meaningful change in the basic
structure and dynamics of its surrounding layers and, ultimately, of the
financial system as a whole. The Article argues that, in order to make
individual banks' internal ethical standards and cultural practices more
10 See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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"other-regarding" and conducive to prudent risk-taking, it is critical to
change how the broader institutional context in which these banks operate-the market, the industry, the financial and economic system-incentivizes continuous generation and amplification of socially excessive
risk.1 1 In that sense, "improving culture" in finance is an inherently systemic challenge, which can be met fully only if the focus of reforms is
expanded beyond the narrow limits of the firm to encompass the outer
structural layers of the financial system.12Only a structurally sound system
of finance can also be ethically sound.
It is important to note from the outset that this Article focuses explicitly and exclusively on the role of ethics and culture as factors either
facilitating or hindering the key post-crisis policy goal of maintaining
systemic financial stability. Hence the use of the term "risk culture"-or
"culture of risk-taking"-throughout the discussion. 13 The Article's main
concern, therefore, is with the normative determinants and content of financial firms' and individual professionals' ordinary business judgments
and organizational choices. More straightforward instances of unethical
of customer
or criminal conduct, such as fraud or misappropriation
14
Article.
this
of
scope
the
outside
generally
are
funds,
Relatedly, the Article uses terms "culture" and "ethics"-both of
which are notoriously complex, contested, and difficult to define with
precision-as largely synonymous, insofar as they refer to the "soft" normative and relational determinants of financial firms' and professionals'
business conduct. The Article does not seek to weigh in on any academic
debates on what "culture" is, or is not, as a general matter.15 Nor does it
aim to dispute-or intentionally blur-any conventional or philosophical
11 See infra Part IV.
12 Id.

13 See infra Part II.
14 Without a doubt, preventing such immoral and illegal conduct on the part of financial
institutions and professionals is an important public policy objective. Yet, the creation of systemically destabilizing-and particularly socially harmful-financial risk far more often involves people taking actions and making choices that are both legally permissible and
normatively acceptable in the context in which they operate. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame? CORNELL LAW SCHOOL REs. PAPER No. 11-09, available at https://
[hereinafter, "Bubbles, Busts, and
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1805930
Blame"] (arguing that socially harmful asset bubbles and busts happen even without any illegal
or immoral conduct by putatively "bad guys"). It is this kind of legally permissible and not
unequivocally morally wrong conduct that is especially difficult to police and prevent without
a significant shift in the relevant norms and cultural practices. Hence, the focus of this Article
is primarily on that kind of business conduct rather than fraud or other criminal activities.
15 There is a vast and diverse body of academic literature defining and applying the
concept of "culture" in a variety of ways, often encompassing not only norms and attitudes
shared by members of a particular group but also material objects and institutional structures
characteristic of that group. Accordingly, "culture" is often used as a highly capacious sociological or anthropological concept. This Article, however, neither engages with that literature
nor uses the concept of "culture" in that sense.
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boundaries between properly "ethical" questions and questions pertaining to matters of cultural practices more broadly. As explained above, the
Article addresses a very specific debate in the field of financial regulation, in which such universal terms as "culture," "structure," or "ethics"
have acquired specific-and specialized-meanings. In the context of
that particular debate, calls for "improving banks' culture" and "making
bankers more ethical" mean essentially the same thing: ensuring that financial firms and their employees take their public duty seriously and
consistently refrain from pursuing privately profitable but socially harmful business activities. 16 It is this, very practical and concrete, challenge
that is at the heart of the Article and determines its scope.
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II provide the general
policy and conceptual context for the discussion. Part I explains the new
salience of ethics and culture in the post-crisis regulatory reform as a
logical extension of regulators' fundamental concern with safeguarding
systemic financial stability. Part II outlines the general framework for
understanding the interaction among norms, incentives, and business
conduct that is at the core of the policy debate on the culture of finance.
Part III discusses the principal themes in, and limits of, the current policy
and academic debate on reforming the culture of socially excessive risktaking in the financial services sector. Part IV offers an alternative approach to that task by highlighting the critical importance of addressing
the structural determinants of ethical culture in the financial system on a
macro rather than micro level.
I.

Tim POST-POST-CRISIS "ETHICS TURN" IN FINANCIAL

REGULATION

One of the key lessons of the global financial crisis of 2008 concerns the principal importance of safeguarding stability of the financialand, by extension, economic-system, as opposed to preventing failure
of individual financial institutions. This new appreciation of the systemic
aspect of financial risk-taking shaped the post-crisis prioritizing of the
explicitly macro-prudential, as opposed to traditional micro-prudential,
tools and methods of financial firm oversight. 17 Enhanced public regulation and supervision of large banks and other systemically important financial institutions-including heightened capital and liquidity
standards, regular stress testing, more stringent disclosure and reporting
requirements, etc.-is at the center of these ongoing efforts to make the
global financial system safer.18
16
17
18
(2016),

See infra Part III.
See sources cited supra note 3.
See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, FinancialRegulatoryReform After the Crisis:An Assessment
https://www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/policy/DuffieSintraJune20l6.pdf.
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To date, these efforts have met with only partial and often tentative
success. 19 Formulating and then implementing workable macroprudential
rules in various interconnected areas of today's finance has been a slow
and difficult process. Notorious frictions and delays in the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the centerpiece of post-crisis financial regulation reform in the U.S., provide a vivid illustration of this
phenomenon. 20 In part, it is a function of the sheer scope and technical
complexity of the regulatory undertaking. In part, however, it is a product of intense resistance to reforms on the part of the financial industry,
which relentlessly defends its profitability through regulatory arbitrage
and political lobbying. 2 1 As a result, even when regulatory agencies ficontent and practinally manage to issue specific rules, their substantive
22
cal impact are frequently significantly weakened.
In this context, the current resurgence of financial regulators' interest in the role of ethical and cultural norms in shaping financial institutions' and professionals' behavior is hardly a surprising development.
Thus, beginning approximately in late 2013, U.S. financial regulators became particularly and increasingly vocal in their calls for ethically sound
23
behavior and a culture of prudent risk-taking within financial firms.
Two key factors help to explain this regulatory turn to ethics and culture
at this relatively late stage in post-crisis reform process.
First, it is becoming increasingly clear that the ultimate obstacle to
successful regulatory reform is the financial industry's persistent reluctance or inability to internalize macroprudential constraints on its risktaking as a matter of its public duty, a moral obligation to protect society
from harm. To put it simply, even the most sophisticated and technically
nuanced post-crisis regulatory requirements will fail to achieve their goal
of limiting excessive risk-taking in the financial system, if financial institutions continue circumventing them in practice. And experience shows
that financial institutions will continue circumventing rules, if they view
them as a product of coercion rather than conviction. From that perspec19 Id.

20 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). This
was the case even before the recently intensified efforts by Congressional Republicans and the
Trump Administration to roll back the key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
21 See Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank, THE NATION (Apr. 30,
2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-wall-street-defanged-dodd-frank/; Jonathan
Weisman & Eric Lipton, In New Congress, Wall St. Pushes to Undermine Dodd-Frank,N. Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/0l/14business/economy/in-new-congress-wall-st-pushes-to-undermine-dodd-frank-reform.html.
22 See Victoria McGrane, Wall Street, Banks Press to Shape Dodd-FrankRules, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 100014240527487048894045762
77364034089104.
23 See Governance & Culture Reform: Archive, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., https://www
.newyorkfed.org/govemance-and-culture-reform/archive.html.
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tive, the increasing emphasis on ethical conduct and culture of prudent
risk-taking within financial firms represents regulators' latest attempt to
supplement and bolster the efficacy of the evolving "hard" law through
"soft" means. 24
Another factor explaining the heightened salience of ethical conduct
on the post-crisis reform agenda is the regulators' growing-and quite
legitimate-concern over the continuing erosion of public trust and confidence in banks and other financial institutions. It is well understood that
maintaining public trust in the banking system is a necessary ingredient
of financial stability and proper functioning of the modern economy. 25
Financial crises are typically triggered by, and further amplify, the contagious spread of mistrust and loss of confidence in the ability of the financial system to function as intended.2 6
The financial crisis of 2008 was a textbook example of this destructive pattern. Numerous analyses of the causes of that crisis revealed a
disturbingly pervasive pattern of financial institutions' reckless disregard
not only for law but also for basic moral considerations. 27 A long string
of enforcement actions against numerous U.S. and European banks for
systematic legal violations and outright fraud in connection with their
pre-crisis mortgage origination and marketing practices, which kept these
misdeeds in the limelight long after the crisis subsided, further reinforced
the popular perception of banks as inherently immoral actors.2 8 At the
same time, the banking industry was hit with a new wave of fines and
prosecutions for manipulating pretty much all of the key benchmark
24 As William Dudley put it in one of his speeches,
Culture-within a firm or across an industry-is not determined primarily by rules
or laws, though certainly rules and laws can amplify good or bad attributes. Culture
comprises, instead, what people observe and do, resulting in accepted and mostly
unspoken norms. Mostly, people look for what succeeds and what does not, and
they try to align themselves with the former.
William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Worthy of
Trust?, Law, Ethics, and Culture in Banking, Panel Remarks at the Bank of England, London,
U.K. (Mar. 21, 2017), (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2017/dud 170321 a).
25 See Dudley, supra note 1.
26 There is a vast literature examining these dynamics, both historically and analytically.
See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT

CRASH: 1929 (1997).
27 See, e.g., STAFF

OF FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY

REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL AND

ECONOMIC CRISIS IN Ta

UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC

.pdf; STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 8; LORD ADAIR

A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS,
FIN. SERV. AuTH. (2009), http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2009/FSATurnerReport-on
Financial_

TURNER, THE TURNER REvraw:

Crisis_2009.pdf.
28 See Kara Scannell, US Haul from Credit Crisis Bank Fines Hits $150bn, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/71cee844-7863-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71.
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30
29
prices in global financial markets: LIBOR, EURIBOR, precious met-

als, 3 1 and foreign exchange rates. 32 And, as if to show that fraud and
corruption are not confined to opaque wholesale markets, Wells Fargo
was caught cheating its depositors by creating millions of unauthorized
33
accounts and otherwise siphoning off their retail customers' money.
In response to these scandalous revelations-including, most immediately, those related to systematic manipulation of LIBOR and foreign
exchange rates-the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) embarked on a high-profile campaign to "improve culture" of banking institutions. 34 In a series of high-profile speeches at high-level gatherings,
top-ranking bank regulators forcefully called on the financial industry to
and to foster a
behave in a more ethical manner, to curb its risk-taking,
35
robust culture of voluntary compliance with the law.
The regulators framed this as a practical imperative on two principal
grounds: as the means of ensuring long-term financial stability and re36
storing public trust in the financial system. Importantly, systemic stability and trustworthiness of financial institutions are seen as two sides of
29 LIBOR stands for the London Interbank Offering Rate, which for decades served as
the leading benchmark for pricing derivatives and debt instruments in global financial markets.
In 2012, it was revealed that LIBOR was systematically manipulated by the banks submitting
data used to calculate it. For a compilation of materials on the LIBOR scandal, see FINANCIAL
TuvrEs, LIBOR Scandal, https://www.ft.com/libor-scandal.
30 Similarly to LIBOR, EURIBOR is the key benchmark interest rate for the Euro-denominated financial contracts. See James Titcomb, Three Banks Accused of Rigging
EURIBOR, THE TELEGRAPH (May 20, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysec
tor/banksandfinance/10843666/Three-hanks-accused-of-rigging-Euribor.html31 See Alan Feuer, Banks Sued on Claims of Fixing Price of Gold, N. Y. TnWms (May 5,
2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/banks-sued-on-claims-of-fixing-price-ofgold/.
32 See Sebastian Chrispin, Forex Scandal: How to Rig the Market, BBC NEWS (May 20,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905.
33 See Kate Berry, Wells opened far more fake accounts than originally estimated, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 31, 2017); Stacey Cowley & Matthew Goldstein, Accusations of Fraudat Wells
Fargo Spread to Sham Insurance Policies, N. Y. TnMEs (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/12/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-accusations-sham-insurance-policies.html.
34 See William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
at the Culture Imperative-An Interbank Symposium (Jan. 11, 2017), (transcript available at
7
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2017/dudl Ol 11). According to Dudley,
The manipulations of LIBOR and foreign exchange rates prompted the New
York Fed's work on culture. Of course, widespread misconduct did not originate
with either episode. The timing, however, was significant. Despite the near-death
experience of the financial crisis, new rules and regulations, and-in some caseslarge fines and penalties, the LIBOR and FX events made clear that serious ethical
and behavioral problems had persisted in the industry. I was particularly struck by
how the manipulation of foreign exchange rates occurred even after the LIBOR fixing was widely known. The appropriate lessons from the LIBOR scandal did not
seem to have been learned.
35 The FRBNY's online archive contains a large number of speeches and documents
from the events organized by the FRBNY since the beginning of 2014. See supra note 23.
36 See Dudley, supra note 1.
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the same coin. In fact, one of the most distinctive aspects of the postcrisis ethics turn is regulators' explicit emphasis on so-called "culture of
risk-taking" or "risk culture." 37 Risk-taking-and risk management for
their clients and customers-is at the core of financial services firms'
business. Moreover, the level and nature of risk taken by individual
banking institutions is subject to direct regulation and supervision by the
relevant government agencies. In this context, the regulators' effort to
reframe risk-taking as an ethical and cultural matter signals their desire
to push financial institutions toward a new paradigm of decision-making:
one that takes into account not only their own economic interests and
explicit legal obligations, but also potentially socially harmful consequences of their privately lucrative and legally permissible but systemically destabilizing risk-taking. 38
Notably, the regulators explicitly and insistently try to justify the
need for the financial industry to re-establish its own trustworthiness in
the eyes of the broader society by appealing to the industry's economic
self-interest. This is how the FRBNY President, William Dudley, put it,
Why should we seek better culture in the financial
services industry? We do this to achieve better outcomes
in terms of conduct and behavior-and, with that,
greater trustworthiness in our nation's financial system.
Greater trustworthiness will make it easier for the financial industry to perform its role in supporting economic
activity and rising living standards. Greater trustworthiness will also make it easier to attract top talent into the
industry. Without that, the industry will suffer. 39
This "recent, vibrant, and widespread" official push for ethical conduct and culture, unsurprisingly, has reinvigorated the ongoing academic
37 It is worth noting here that, in the post-crisis industry-wide discourse, "risk culture"
became a fashionable term of art that generally denotes a financial firm's internal attitudes and
processes for identifying and assessing the risk of insolvency and other risks the firm's business activities pose to its financial survival. See, e.g., Patricia Jackson, Understanding Risk
Culture and Its Challenges, Q2 THE CLEARING HOUSE, BANKING PERSPECTIVE 48, 48 (2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-understanding-risk-culture-and-its-challenges/$FILE/EY-understanding-risk-culture-and-its-challenges.pdf ("Of the issues currently
bedeviling financial services firms, risk culture is one of the foremost."). While it is difficult to
draw clear definitional lines, the industry uses the term "risk culture" in a distinct, more narrowly technocratic sense. The regulators' interest in improving the culture of risk-taking in the
financial sector, however, is much more explicitly normative and driven by the broader public
policy interest in safeguarding financial stability and ensuring long-term economic health of
the entire system.
38 See Dan Awrey, William Blair & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is
There a Role for Culture and Ethics in FinancialRegulation? 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 217
(discussing the importance of "other regarding" behavioral norms in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis).
39 See Dudley, supra note 34.
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debate on the issue.40 There is a vast and varied body of literature on the
role of ethical norms, psychological biases, organizational choices, and
other factors loosely categorized as constituting "ethics" and "culture"or what may be called "ethical culture" 4 1-in shaping conduct of, and
within, various social groups and business entities. Economists, organizational theorists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and legal
scholars have long grappled with various aspects of this complex, fluid,
and arguably omnipresent phenomenon. It would be futile to attempt a
comprehensive review of all these different bodies of scholarship in a
single article. Yet, even a high-level overview of the principal themes in
that wide-ranging debate is instructive: it helps both (1) to distill some of
the dominant diagnoses of and prescriptions for solving the problem of
persistent ethical failures in the financial services industry, and (2) to
identify key shared weaknesses of such diagnoses and prescriptions.
Before proceeding to a substantive critique of the current approaches to reforming the ethic and culture of finance, however, it is
helpful to start by outlining the conceptual terrain on which the debate
takes place.
II.

UNPACKING THE CULTURE OF FINANCE:

NoRms, INCENTIVES, CONDUCT

Terms like "ethics," "morals," "culture" are inherently difficult to
define with precision. 42 Depending on the context, they may be treated
either as synonyms or as substantively distinct concepts. My purpose in
writing this Article, however, is not to engage in semantic line-drawing
exercises or to conduct a general socio-philosophical inquiry into the nature of moral and cultural norms. 43 I do not intend to contribute to, or to
utilize the latest advances in, theoretical debate on subjects like psychological motives driving human behavior, typology and organizational determinants of "ethical climates" within firms, and the like.44 For the
specific purpose of discussing the current state of the financial services
industry, it makes practical sense to treat ethics and culture as significantly overlapping phenomena. For simplicity's sake, I will primarily use
40 Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers, 42(3) J. CORP. L. 559, 566
(2017).
41 See Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 194 (explaining their use of the term "ethical
culture" as a function of the inherent difficulty with separating the two concepts).
42 See, e.g., Gordon & Zaring, supra note 40,at 561 (discussing the difficulty of defining

and measuring "culture").
43 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
44 The social science literature examining these issues is vast, fascinating, and impossible to summarize effectively in the space of a short article. For a helpful overview of some of
this literature, see, e.g., David M. Mayer, A Review of the Literature on Ethical Climate and
Culture, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE AND CULTURE (2014).
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"culture" as the more capacious term encompassing moral and ethical
45
aspects of modem finance.
It is also important to emphasize that the concept of "culture" in the
post-crisis regulatory vocabulary has a specific contextual meaning: it is
defined primarily by reference to its role as an extra-legal tool of enhancing systemic financial stability and limiting socially harmful risk-taking
in the financial sector. Accordingly, this Article will use terms "culture"
and "risk culture" interchangeably: we are only interested in financial
firms' and professionals' "culture" to the extent it affects their attitudes
toward risk-taking and compliance with prudential regulations.
With these caveats in mind, it is possible to start outlining the basic
conceptual framework for discussing the causes of, and potential remedies for, the presently deeply dysfunctional culture of finance.
A.

Norms

Generally, culture is understood as a complex phenomenon that encompasses the relevant community's or group's shared beliefs, attitudes,
norms, as well as actual practices and patterns of conduct that reflect and
support such beliefs, attitudes, and norms. In other words, any particular
group's culture has both a normative and a behavioral aspect. These
norms and behaviors are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
As a practical matter, we may care mainly about specific conduct of
group members that affects outsiders: Do their actions hurt third parties
or otherwise go against broader ethical norms? In the area of finance, in
particular, the overarching concern is to prevent professionals from abusing their superior informational capabilities and other advantages to the
detriment of their customers, clients, and the public in general. To the
extent group members' actions reflect their shared values and expectations, however, changing "bad" behavior by individuals necessarily requires changing the group's norms. In that sense, "bad" culture functions
like the nutrient medium in a petri dish, which enables bacteria to
grow-and the key to controlling the rate of growth of bacteria is controlling the mixture in the dish.
So, what determines the composition and other key characteristics
of that medium? Some norms and expectations that underlie behavior
within and across financial firms are direct products of legal and regulatory requirements and, in that sense, are externally imposed and public
policy-driven. One example of such an internalized regulatory dictate is
the presently widely shared norm that securities professionals have to
45 It is important to reiterate here that this directly tracks the common usage of the terms
"ethics" and "culture" in the current academic and policy debate on macroprudential financial
regulation. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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disclose to their clients the existence of any serious conflict of interests
with respect to a particular investment they are recommending. 4 6 In fact,
most norms of professional conduct in the financial sector are regulatory
or quasi-regulatory in origin. 47 These norms are typically easily traceable
to and clearly specified in the applicable laws and administrative rules.
For this very reason, however, private market actors do not always fully
internalize and incorporate these norms into their day-to-day conduct of
business. In other words, not every legally mandated practice reaches the
status of a universally shared industry norm or functions as an organic
group value.
Another set of less formalized but deeply internalized and pervasive
norms and attitudes that shape financial firms' and professionals' culture
reflects the economic profit-driven dictates of the market in which these
actors operate. Perhaps most importantly, the financial system-just like
the broader capitalist economy-operates on the fundamental assumption
that pursuit of individual economic gain through freely-negotiated, selfinterested exchange is the ultimate legitimating force in financial markets
and a fundamental right of each market participant. 48 It is commonly
viewed as the very raison d'etre of the free capitalist market. In this context, private profit-seeking is not only an expected behavior but also a
normative baseline. Accordingly, any limits on private profit-seeking derived on the basis of considerations outside of the economic exchange at
hand are inherently suspect not only as a practical but also as a moral
matter. In their pure form, the "morals of the marketplace," to which
Justice Cardozo famously referred in 1928, entail little more than
straightforward economic rationality minus outright dishonesty and
49
illegality.
Finally, the culture of modern finance is generally reflective of the
fundamental moral values, principles, and beliefs prevailing in the
broader community. Certain universal human norms, such as a moral
norm against committing theft, clearly buttress both the endogenous market norms and exogenous legal mandates. On the other hand, universal
46 This is not to say, of course, that this particular norm is universally observed and
never violated in practice. The point is merely that there is now a generally shared expectation
of such disclosure among financial market participants, which is a direct product of the ex-

isting regulatory regime rather than any "natural" market evolution.
47 This is especially obvious in the case of securities broker-dealers subject to elaborate
rules of conduct under the federal securities laws and self-regulatory organizations' rules. See
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration: Conduct
Regulation of Broker-Dealers, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/divi
sionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html#V; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), FINRA
Manual: Conduct Rules (2000-3000), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/displaymain.html
?rbid=2403&elementid=3602.
48 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
49 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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moral norms are not easily reconciled-and often directly conflict-with
the fundamental market-derived norms that glorify individualism and economic self-interest. Because these moral norms tend to operate primarily on the individual level and are inherently context-specific, however,
it is difficult to trace or evaluate how or to what extent they actually
influence specific conduct or the overall culture of financial firms or
markets. In particular, it is difficult to discern or postulate some form of
a general principle for resolving conflicts between universal moral norms
and market-driven expectations and attitudes. Ultimately, it is that everpresent tension that both gives rise to the problem of defining the role of
ethics and culture in the financial marketplace and makes its resolution
so challenging in practice.
B.

OrganizationalDynamics

Organizational culture is a product of complex interaction among all
of these different categories of norms, attitudes, expectations. At times,
these different levels of normativity are mutually reinforcing, and at
other times they are in conflict with one another. The continuous process
of constructing and reconstructing a particular firm's internally shared
hierarchy of norms and normatively sanctioned behavior takes place
within its organizational and decision-making structure. That structure
encompasses not only formalized intra-firm divisions and lines of author50
ity but also informal relational and communicative mechanisms.
The former, of course, plays a far more salient role in shaping the
firm's ethical identity. For example, if the top management of the firm
expressly prioritizes the firm's short-term profitability over all other
objectives, the firm's cultural attitude toward risk-taking will be more
overtly aggressive and disregarding of third parties' interests. This simple fact explains financial regulators' emphasis on the importance of the
right "tone from the top," an intangible element that determines the quality of the firm's culture of compliance both with the law and with the
5
general norms of ethical behavior. '
To complicate matters, however, the firm management's policy of
rewarding privately profitable but socially excessive risk-taking-or
"bad tone from the top"-is often justified as fundamentally reflecting
and reinforcing the broader cultural norm of self-interest. 52 In this sense,
it may not be quite as unambiguously "bad" as the regulatory rhetoric
50 See, e.g., Gordon & Zaring, supra note 40, at 565 ("Culture may be found within the
interplay of directive action and organically arising forces.").
51 See, e.g., Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor and Chief Exec. Officer, Prudential Regulatory Authority of the United Kingdom, Culture in Financial Services-A Regulator's Perspective, at City Week 2016 Conference (May 9, 2016), (transcript available at http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech901 .pdf).
52 See Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 216.
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implies: the underlying norms of capitalist marketplace imperceptibly
shift the scale of moral judgment, making it inherently difficult to draw
clear lines between acceptable and unacceptable managerial choices. Ultimately, it is this built-in ability to appeal to such deeply held values as
self-interest, individualism, freedom-however they might be interpreted
in any specific context-that provides a powerful normative justification
for, and therefore sustains, many socially harmful business practices in
financial markets.
This illustrates how normative signaling from the firm's top managers down to its lower-level employees involves a lot more that simply
making discrete choices with respect to concrete matters, such as compensation criteria. Rather, it is a continuous process of navigating
through, prioritizing, and resolving conflicts among numerous layers of
norms and expectations. The result of this two-way process-top-down
signaling and bottom-up feedback-is a dynamic normative hierarchy: a
clearly, albeit largely implicitly, established order of preferred values,
judgments, and actions. This hierarchical order of shared values, attitudes, and behavioral preferences is what constitutes the firm's risk
culture.
C.

Incentives

This process of dynamic construction of a shared normative hierarchy, or continuous generation and affirmation of organizational culture,
operates primarily through the structuring of incentives. The firm's top
managers prioritize specific norms not only by declaring their intent to
do so but, more importantly, by establishing a system of tangible rewards
and punishments for their employees' actions that conform to or, conversely, contradict such norms. In other words, norms and valueswhether derived from law, market, or ethics-translate into conduct
through the mediating mechanism of individual and collective incentives.
This basic logic of interaction between norms, incentives, and business conduct, which shapes an individual firm's organizational culture, is
schematically represented in Figure 1. The thickness of the border
around each circle denotes the degree of observability of the relevant
phenomena, with actual conduct being the most readily observable and
norms the least observable element of the firm's culture. Solid arrows
represent more directly traceable causal relationships, while dotted ar53
rows represent more diffuse feedback and reinforcement effects.
53 This Figure is, of course, a greatly simplified schematic representation of what is a far
more fluid and complex relational pattern in reality. The key point here is to show, in a simple
and easy to grasp manner, the centrality of incentives as the core mechanism for translating
intangible institutional norms and values into tangible behavior.
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By transforming norms into actionable preferences that can be readily applied in a specific decisional context, the firm's incentive structure
operates as a practical guide for employees handling the inevitable conflicts of norms in the ordinary course of the firm's business. In that
sense, incentives are the principal levers for changing both the actual
conduct and the norms underlying it. Understanding the sources, hierarchy, and operation of financial institutions' incentives to take risks is the
key to both understanding and reforming the risk culture in the financial
sector. Not surprisingly, therefore, reshaping incentives continues to be
the primary target of the regulatory and academic efforts to curb systemic financial risk.
Just like norms, conduct-shaping incentives emerge in response to
different factors and reflect different internal and external dynamics.
Some of these incentives are formally established within the firm in accordance with its internal governance procedures; others emerge organically as informal mechanisms of group approval or disapproval. Though
complex and contextually rich, this intrafirm incentive structure is generally easy to identify. It is well documented, for example, in firms' official employee compensation or promotion policies. And, as a practical
matter, it's not difficult to figure out what kind of behavior gets you a
bonus or bragging rights, and what kind of behavior gets you fired or
54
shunned.
However, managers' decisions to reward or punish particular actions or attitudes within their firms are themselves shaped, in significant
measure, by their perceptions of what types of firm actions are rewarded
or punished in the broader marketplace. For instance, if firms aggressively generating high short-term profits consistently outcompete firms
conservatively focused on long-term sustainability, any firm operating in
54 See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 24.
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that market will be under pressure to structure its internal employee incentives so as to maximize its own short-term performance.
Despite its apparent common-sense simplicity, this is a critical point
to keep in mind. Just like norms (or substantive inputs in a firm's culture), incentives (or tools for constructing that culture and translating it
into observable conduct) emerge in response to different forces and operate on different levels, both internal and external to the firm. Accordingly, analyzing individual firms' internally constructed incentive
structures is not likely to yield a fully satisfactory causal explanation of
the pervasive ethical dysfunction in modern finance. A deeper understanding of this phenomenon necessarily requires examining the broader
system of institutional incentives in which financial firms and professionals operate-and in which all of the entity-level incentive systems
are actively immersed.
D.

The Culture of Finance as a Matryoshka Doll?

To expand this last point, a deeper understanding of modern finance
as a cultural phenomenon requires an explicitly and comprehensively
systemic, macro-structural lens.
Functionally, the multi-layered culture of finance may be best described by analogy to a traditional Russian nesting doll, or Matryoshka.
In discussing ethical conduct in finance, we ultimately seek to alter
norms driving socially harmful behavior of individual bankers and traders. Individual financial professionals, however, are nested inside financial services firms whose organizational cultures determine much of their
risk-taking behavior. Individual firms, in turn, operate inside a specific
market or industry, and their cultures reflect the incentives and norms
generated in those markets or industry sectors. Various financial markets
and industry sectors operate within the financial system, which is itself
nested inside the broader economic system it is supposed to serve. Finally, the economy operates inside the polity, and the basic norms underlying its operation reflect certain political-i.e., inherently normativechoices.
Tracing the path of norms and incentives from the outermost layer
of the political system all the way down to the innermost level of an
individual banker or trader-the smallest piece hidden deep inside the
giant nesting doll-may seem like a daunting exercise. Of course, the
task of fundamentally altering the currently pervasively "other-disregarding" culture of the financial services sector is itself inherently daunting.
Yet, numerous scholars working in various academic disciplines continue to focus on that task, seemingly undaunted by its enormity. In this
context, the complexity of the analysis required in order to understand
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the Matryoshka-like cultural ecosystem of finance is hardly a compelling
reason not to undertake it.
In fact, the lack of a deliberately systemic, macro-structural approach to analyzing the nature and sources of the dysfunctional culture in
the financial sector is one of the principal factors limiting the ability of
the current academic debate to generate a truly effective and comprehensive remedy for this dysfunction. While important and insightful, the current discussion of the culture of risk-taking in modern finance still
implicitly operates within the familiar confines of an inherently microfocused "bad apples" metaphor, even though the spotlight is now on the
organizational "barrels" in which individual "apples" tend to go "bad" in
such an alarming fashion.
III.

"BETTER BARRELS, BETTER APPLES"?
AND ITS

THE

CURRENT DEBATE

LIMITS

Given the pervasive nature of cultural and ethical factors in human
life, it is not surprising to see a large and diverse body of scholarly analysis and research in this area. Economists, organizational theorists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers, historians, and
legal scholars continue to grapple with various aspects of the fluid and
contextually thick concept of "culture." In this Part, I will focus on a
narrow subset of this scholarship that targets specifically the cultural bias
of financial services firms and professionals in favor of socially excessive, yet privately profitable, risk-taking. Furthermore, instead of attempting to provide a comprehensive review of this literature, my goal is
to identify (1) the principal themes emerging in the debate on the dysfunctional culture of modem finance, and (2) the fundamental weaknesses in the currently proposed approaches to reforming that culture.
Thematically, the scholarly literature on the role of ethical and cultural factors in excessive generation and accumulation of systemic financial risk may be divided into three broadly drawn categories: descriptive
and empirical analyses of the prevailing ethical and cultural norms in the
financial sector; economic theories of organizational culture as a business input; and public policy-driven accounts of the legal and institutional mechanisms of cultural change in the financial sector. By shifting
the focus away from individual misconduct as a mere "bad apples" problem to the broader corporate dynamics-or, to extend the metaphor, the
quality of organizational "apple barrels"-this literature offers important
insights into various aspects of this complex phenomenon. The same entity-level analytical focus, however, also significantly hinders the search
for effective practical solutions to cultural problems in the financial
sector.
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The Culture of Finance as a Social Phenomenon

The first category of scholarly literature relevant to the present discussion is primarily diagnostic in its focus on identifying and explaining
certain socially undesirable aspects of the financial sector ethics and culture. In recent years, there has been an increased interest among social
scientists in unraveling and decoding the many hidden layers of cultural
meanings and interactions inside financial institutions.5 5 One of the bestknown examples of this literature is Karen Ho's recent ethnographic
study of Wall Street, in which she dissects the inner workings of the
investment banking culture.5 6 Using extensive insider interviews, Ho
demonstrates how investment banks' internal incentive system, based on
high bonuses and job insecurity, shapes individual bankers' overly aggressive attitudes toward risk-taking in their dealings with clients and
other business activities. 5 7 Her study shows how the highest-performing
graduates of elite universities, attracted by the exceptionally high remuneration practices in the financial industry, get socialized into this inherently short-termist culture of "high risk, high reward," which is
eventually translated into the highly volatile boom-and-bust dynamics in
58
modern financial markets.
B.

Culture as a Business Input

The second category of scholarship, by contrast, focuses on the role
of corporate culture as a determinant of financial firms' business performance. Not surprisingly, this group is dominated by economists and
organizational theorists. Economists, in particular, use the conceptual apparatus of microeconomics and organizational behavior studies to identify the mechanisms through which a financial firm's adoption of ethical
business practices and explicitly other-regarding cultural norms enhances
the firm's economic returns and organizational efficiency. 59 In these
55 See, e.g., KAREN Ho, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2008); Anne-

lise Riles, Market Collaboration:Finance, Culture, and Ethnography After Neoliberalism, 115
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 557-58 (2013) (examining cultural attitudes of Japanese bankers
in the post-crisis period); Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking
Industry, NATuRE 1 (2014). For a detailed discussion of social science research on culture, see
generally Gordon & Zaring, supra note 40.
56 Ho, supra note 55.
57 Id.
58 Id. Along somewhat similar lines, various experimental studies show persistent psychological bias among financial industry professionals toward more overtly selfish and dishonest behavior and excessive risk-taking. See, e.g., C. W. Smith, FinancialEdgework: Trading in
Market Currents, in EDGEWORK: THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISK TAKING (Stephen Lyng ed., 2005);

Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr & Michel Andrd Mar6chal, Business Culture and Dishonesty in the
Banking Industry, NATuRE 516, No. 7569, 86 (2014).
59 This literature is too vast to be cited in full here. For a sample of recent examples, see
O'Toole & Bennis, supra note 2; Anjan Thakor, Corporate Culture in Banking, FRBNY
ECON. POL'Y Rav. 5, 8 (Aug. 2016); Werner H. Erhard, Michael C. Jensen & Steve Zaffron,
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studies, ethical culture is analyzed in instrumental terms, as part of a
private firm's business strategy and an objectively measurable input in its
internal risk management and business processes. Creating and maintaining the right kind of firm culture, accordingly, is recast as an internal
managerial function, rather than a moral duty the firm owes to the
outside world. 60 For example, greater transparency becomes important
not so much because it is morally significant or publicly beneficial but
because it enhances the quality of the firm's business decisions and facil61
itates its growth.
From that angle, firm culture is conceptualized not as a fuzzy, subjective judgment-driven space filler but as a functionally cabined, positive phenomenon that is both malleable and controllable. 62 Anjan
Thakor, for example, advocates the use of so-called Competing Values
Framework, borrowed from the organizational behavior literature, and
maps out four principal types of value-enhancing strategies and corresponding culture types: Clan (collaborative), Control (hierarchical), Market (competitive), and Adhocracy (innovative). 63 Under this approach,
each individual firm's organizational culture can be both graphically diagnosed as a particular mix of these different value types and then
changed through the use of such institutional levers as compensation and
64
performance metrics.
Andrew Lo takes this idea further by proposing to develop a quantitative model for measuring and tracking behavioral risks as the basis for
managing and changing culture. 65 Lo posits that thoughtfully combining
certain key elements-such as, e.g., human resources and social network
data, regulatory survey results, and latest advances in psychological research and empirical modeling of fraud and malfeasance-enables the
development of "an empirically based methodology for predicting individual and group behavior" as a "function of observable systematic and
Integrity: A Positive Model that Incorporatesthe Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics,
and Legality - Abridged, Harvard Business School NOM Working Paper No. 10-061 (1 Feb.
2016).
60 See, e.g., Thakor, supra note 59, at 8 ("The culture of the organization must support
the execution of the organization's growth strategy.").
61 See generally O'Toole & Bennis, supra note 2 (arguing that candor improves
performance).
62 Michael Jensen and his co-authors go as far as replacing inherently "soft" concepts of
morality and culture with a limited, technically defined concept of "integrity." See Erhard et
al., supra note 59.
63 See Thakor, supra note 59, at 9-10.
64 Thakor identifies four key levers of cultural change: performance metrics, employee
compensation, decision-making and resource allocation procedures, and behaviors to be rewarded or punished. Id. at 12-13.
65 See Andrew W. Lo, The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial
Industry, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 17, 35-36 (Aug. 2016).
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idiosyncratic factors."' 66 Robust predictive modeling of each individual
employee's risk appetite, for example, would yield a reliable quantitative
definition of the firm's overall risk culture. 67 According to Lo, once the
behavioral patterns, values, and goals are identified and measured, the
firm would be able to target specific changes in its risk-taking culture
68
more effectively.
These are just select-but highly representative-examples of economists seeking to transform the study of culture and its production into
simply another branch of the established "science" of risk management
within the business firm. 69 The apparent pragmatism and rigor (at least,
in aspirational terms) of this approach to reforming culture explain its
seductive appeal beyond the disciplinary boundaries of economics. Notably, financial regulators successfully incorporated it into their rhetoric by
emphasizing that "good culture" is in financial firms' economic self-interest. 70 The warm glow of a straightforward and undisruptive "win-

win" solution to a complex problem is a powerful thing.
The difficulty, though, is explaining why it remains so stubbornly
elusive in practice.
C.

Culture as Institutional Governance
The third category of academic writings on the ethics and culture in

the financial sector focuses not on firms' internal economic calculus but
on the legal and institutional mechanisms for bringing their organizational risk culture in line with the broader public interest and public policy. Not surprisingly, most legal scholars interested in the culture of
finance find themselves in this thematic camp.
A significant portion of legal scholarship in this area is largely descriptive or expositional in character, as experts in various areas of law66 Id. at 37.
67 See id. at 36-37.

68 Id. at 38. As Lo concludes,

[C]ulture can be a choice, not a fixed constraint. The emerging discipline of
behavioral risk management can be means by which a corporation's culture is measured and managed. And, thanks to advances in the behavioral and social sciences,
big data, and human resources management, for the first time in regulatory history,
we have the intellectual means to construct behavioral risk models. We just need the
will to do so.
69 While acknowledging the importance of cultivating "a sense of higher purpose" for
financial services firms, this scholarship is generally averse to veering too far from the firm's
business goals. Financial firms' "higher purpose" is often defined quite modestly as helping
their clients manage their money or achieve their financial goals. See Thakor, supra note 59, at
13-14.
70 See, e.g., William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. of the Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Reforming Culturefor the Long Term, at the Banking Standards Board, London, U.K.

(Mar. 20, 2017), (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2017/dud170321).
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banking, securities, corporate, etc.-attempt to analyze and place the
post-crisis regulatory "ethics turn" in a broader doctrinal or normative
context. 71 It is a valuable exercise, as it helps to ground regulators' vague
calls for "more ethical" culture and conduct in institutional realities. It
elucidates how the presently growing interest in these inherently "soft"
factors potentially interacts with the ongoing efforts to reinforce the ex72
isting "hard" law governing financial institutions.
While it is difficult to distill a single substantive thread in these
discussions, most scholars appear to be cautious, if not outright skeptical,
about regulators' practical ability to channel the financial industry's energy into tempering its appetite for high risk and high return. 7 3 The apparent contrast between traditional methods of curbing financial firms'
risk-taking through formal regulation and supervision, on the one hand,
and the increasing salience of moral suasion as part of regulators' toolkit,
on the other, has prompted academics to inquire "as to what it means to
74
operationalize ethics and culture in a regulatory project."
So far, however, this collective inquiry has produced little by way
of a unified vision or theory. As a general matter, legal scholars advocate
reforming the presently dysfunctional culture in the financial sector
through incremental-and often complementary and mutually reinforcing-changes in financial firms' internal corporate governance and the
external regulatory framework within which they operate. The focus is
primarily on correcting the basic incentive structure within financial
firms in ways designed to discourage socially undesirable risk-takingand to do so through contractual (private ordering) and governmental
(public regulation) means.
One specific measure, widely discussed and advocated as a potential
solution to a whole range of problems in the financial sector, involves
reforming the performance-based compensation structure within financial services firms. 75 Legal scholars generally agree that banks should
avoid tying their employees' and executives' salaries and bonuses to
banks' short-term profits-a potentially systemically destabilizing factor-and use more integrative measures of banks' long-term sustainability to incentivize bank employees and executives to act in a more
See, e.g., Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 191; Gordon & Zaring, supra note 40, at 563.
See id.; Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559,
1561-63 (2016).
73 See, e.g., Gordon & Zaring, supra note 40, at 564-65.
74 Id. at 559.
75 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO.
L. J. 247, 249-53 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Dodd-Frank: Why
FinancialReform Tends to be Frustratedand Systemic Risk Perpetuated,97 CORNELL L. REv.
1019, 1047 (2012); CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BEITER BANKERS, BETTER
BANKS 160-61 (2015).
71

72
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socially responsible manner. A system of compensation clawbacks, in
particular, is commonly viewed as a potentially effective method76of altering the monetary incentives of individual bankers and traders.
The main weakness of these proposals is the inherent difficulty of
ensuring that compensation limits and mandatory clawbacks actually
help to reduce the level of systemic risk on the front end. 77 On the other
hand, the beauty of a compensation-based reform is that it does not require regulatory intervention and aligns well with the basic tenets of corporate law and governance. 7 8 Claire Hill and Richard Painter, for
example, propose that investment banks impose contractual obligations
on their highly paid bankers to bear personal liability for some portion of
their banks' losses from excessive risk-taking or violations of law. 79 This

system of "covenant banking" would, Hill and Painter argue, force individual bankers to internalize the costs of their socially irresponsible actions and, consequently, to adopt a more conservative ex ante attitude
toward financial and legal risk.8°
Another approach to improving the ethical culture of finance seeks
to incentivize financial firms' boards of directors to pay greater attention
to their firms' culture, either by changing the board structure or by expanding directors' liability under fiduciary standards. 8 1 Thus, one suggestion is for every financial firm to establish a special ethics committee
charged with setting specific ethical "outcomes," measuring the firm's
processes for achieving such outcomes, and putting in place ethical disciplinary procedures. 8 2 Another proposed measure is to strengthen the judicial standard for the duty of care applicable to certain ethically or
systemically salient decisions by firm directors. 8 3 And some scholars
even advocate expanding the traditional scope of directors' and managers' fiduciary duties to hold them legally accountable to the firm-or
various stakeholders that act as proxies for the firm or the public-for
84
systemically destabilizing risk-taking.
76 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 75; Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 236; Skinner,
supra note 72, at 1603-04.
77 See Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 234-38.
78 Thus, aligning compensation with the corporation's and its shareholders' long-term
interests is seen as a way of solving the agency problem, the central preoccupation of the
mainstream corporate law theory. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 75, at 257, 269.
79 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 75, at 177-78.
80 Hill and Painter argue that this forward-looking, ex ante nature of incentives renders
their proposed covenant banking a more effective option than proposals to limit the amount of
executive compensation. Id. at 178-79.
81 See Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 232-34.
82 Id. at 234.
83 Id. at 242-44.
84 See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and ShareholderValue,
6 J. LEGAL ANALYsIS 35, 50 (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Systemic Risk Through
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Expanding the concept of fiduciary duty beyond its traditional
boundaries, however, creates numerous doctrinal and practical difficulties. 85 It is also prone to criticism as a judicial enforcement mechanism
likely to "crowd out" potential organic improvements in a financial
firm's culture. 86 In that sense, tinkering with directors' fiduciary duties is
likely to be less effective in practice than overt regulation and supervision. Building on this intuition, Christina Skinner proposes expanding
the practice of mandatory stress testing of systemically important financial institutions to include so-called "compliance stress tests," which
would involve misconduct simulation exercises and supervisory review
of each firm's "compliance plans. ' 87 This scheme would effectively seek
to repurpose the basic techniques of quantitative supervisory tests of
banks' capital and liquidity positions-both crucial financial metricsfor qualitative testing of the strength of their regulatory compliance function. 88 It is, of course, unclear how amenable to such qualitative
repurposing the existing supervisory stress-testing toolkit would be in
practice.
Another group of legal scholars is looking for more subtle, collaborative methods to improve the culture in the financial sector, which explicitly combine private ordering with public regulation. For example,
Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw "examine how 'processoriented' regulation, backed by a credible threat of both public enforcement and reputational sanctions, might be employed with a view to reframing personal ethical choices and fostering a more ethical
organizational culture within financial services firms."'89 They use the
UK's regulatory initiative, Treating Customers Fairly (TCF), as the
model of such a process-oriented strategy that can be extended from the
area of retail consumer and investor protection to wholesale financial
markets and systemic risk prevention. 90 As Awrey and his co-authors
emphasize, this model seeks to foster more effective compliance with the
principles of ethical conduct not through compulsion but through meaningful engagement with desired regulatory outcomes: it is the process of
dialogue, implementation, self-assessment, and dissemination of knowlCorporate Governance, CIGI Policy Brief No. 99 1, 2 (Feb. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2933045.
85 For an analysis of such difficulties, see generally Robert C. Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries Special? 68 ALA. L. REv. 1071 (2017).
86 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Alan D. Morrison, William J. Wilhelm, Jr., The SEC v.
Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP.
L. 529, 530-33 (2012) (arguing that expanding fiduciary duty standards in investment banking
might harm banks' reputational incentives to behave in a trustworthy manner).
87 Skinner, supra note 72, at 1600-01.
88 Id. at 1600.
89 Awrey et al., supra note 38, at 191.
90 Id. at 196.
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91
edge that ultimately produces a more ethical culture within the firm.
Importantly, however, the key to success of this approach is a credible
not only with respect to outthreat of external regulatory enforcement,
92
comes but also with respect to process.
While sharing this fundamental appreciation of the broader institutional context in which firms operate, Cynthia Williams and John Conley
place a greater emphasis on "soft law" and "new governance" methods
directly complementary to self-regulation. 93 Drawing inspiration from
various private initiatives to embrace corporate social responsibility,
Williams and Conley propose changing accounting standards and requir' 94 Under their
ing financial institutions to provide "social risk disclosure.
proposed system of integrated accounting, large financial firms would be
required to report their "financial, social, environmental, and governance
information. ' 95 In order to meet these integrated reporting requirements,
financial firms would have to engage in regular data-gathering and selfreflective analysis of their contribution to long-term social value-creation
- which, in turn, would drive an organic change in their internal culture
96
and ethical climate.

D. The Limits of the Current Debate
In sum, the current debate on the causes of and remedies for the
currently pervasive ethical problems in the financial industry spans many
an academic discipline-sociology, anthropology, economics, and law,
just to name a few-and encompasses different approaches to culture as
a social phenomenon, a business input, or a product of legal and institutional choices. While a brief overview of this literature, attempted
above, cannot present an in-depth analysis of all relevant scholarship, it
enables us to make a few important observations on the scope, framing,
and other defining features of the public debate.
First of all, the principal focus of academic and policy discussions is
on an individual financial services firm. A single financial firm-a discrete corporate entity-remains the key unit of descriptive analysis and
the primary target of prescriptive proposals on reforming culture in the
financial sector. Individual human beings and their ethical choices are
examined and evaluated within the context of, and through the prism of
91 Id. at 221-25.
92 Id. at 226.
93 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of Banking, 39 J. CORP. L.
459, 473-74 (2014).
94 Id., at 484.

95 Id. at 487.
96 Id. at 488.
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their functional roles, in the firm. 97 External institutional arrangements
and norms-those at the level of the financial services industry, broader
market economy, or society at large-are typically considered only to the
extent they affect, or are mediated through, the firm's internal cultural
dynamics.
Furthermore, the main target of scholarly efforts to diagnose and
correct the existing risk culture within financial services firms is the
structure of organizational incentives-monetary, disciplinary, or reputational-that encourage or discourage potentially excessive levels of risktaking by individual firm employees and managers. The most commonly
discussed categories of entity-level incentives include compensation
practices (and related performance metrics) and organizational accountability structures (including the assignment of legal duties and
liabilities). 98
Finally, underlying the academic and policy debate is a general normative preference for a "win-win" solution to the problem of "bad conduct" and excessive risk-taking in the financial sector. An unspoken
assumption that private firms' economic interests can, and should, be
fully aligned with the public interest in preserving financial stability subtly, but forcefully, sets the key normative parameters within which the
discussions take place. It also determines the range of acceptable reform
choices. Thus, commonly discussed measures for improving the ethical
culture of financial firms implicitly incorporate-and often explicitly appeal to-the prevailing ideological attitudes and values of self-interest
and individualism.9 9 The concrete reform measures are deliberately
framed as incremental changes to the existing legal and institutional arrangements, as such arrangements operate at the individual firm level,
rather than a radical rewiring of the financial system's architecture.10 0
Many of these proposed reform measures are potentially useful and
socially desirable. There is no doubt, for example, that financial firms'
compensation practices and internal governance mechanisms should be
97 This isn't to say that scholars are not interested in understanding and reshaping individual ethics and conduct. For example, Hill and Painter explicitly focus on individual bankers' moral choices and seek to alter their conduct, but see certain firm-level changes as the
most effective method of doing so. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
98 As discussed above, some reform proposals more explicitly incorporate certain external factors, such as regulatory regime changes or changes in the industry's accounting standards, as important drivers of the risk-taming cultural changes within the financial sector. See
supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even these proposals generally view
such external factors as simply anchoring and facilitating the cultural shift at the level of
individual firms, which remain the primary intended site of reform.
99 See supra Part III.B-C.
100 In this respect, the debate on the ethics and culture of finance is fundamentally similar
to, and significantly overlaps with, the broader debate on the role of financial firms' corporate
governance as a tool of systemic risk prevention. For a small sample, see sources cited supra
notes 84-86.
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changed in ways that reduce incentives for the firms and their employees
to act unethically or destabilize the financial system. The devil, however,
is in the details of designing and implementing this change in practice.
And the most important detail of all is how to ensure that every financial
institution-a private firm legitimately pursuing private profits-adopts
and faithfully implements socially beneficial compensation or governance practices, despite the fact that doing so is likely to reduce its profitability and competitive strength. What would it take for a privatelyowned firm to resist the all-powerful gravitational pull of private profitgeneration for the sake of some generalized public good?
This fundamental tension between the legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest by private entities, on the one hand, and the public
interest in preventing systemic harms, on the other, remains unresolved
in the current intellectual debate on the culture of finance. Oscillating
between abstract aspirations and incremental fixes, the debate lacks an
overarching theory of how to make financial firms' internal cultures significantly more other-regarding and socially responsible. Despite many
academics' valiant and valuable efforts, we do not yet have a satisfactory
strategy for resolving "the critical issue of our time: how can the genius
of finance be channeled for positive social development rather than being
used solely for private gain at any social cost?" 10 1
To resolve this issue, we need to shift our collective thinking on the
risk culture in the financial sector onto a higher, more systemic plane and look for more effective solutions outside the limiting scope of the
present debate. Of course, moving away from blaming the widespread
ethical problems in the financial sector on individual "bad apples" within
organizations to examining the soundness of organizational "apple barrels" is an important step toward a better understanding of such
problems. But is it possible to improve the quality of individual firms'
risk cultures without understanding-and acting upon-the broader context in which these firms do business, market conditions to which they
have to adjust, and external incentives which shape their choices?
IV.

TOWARD SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS:

A

MACRO-STRUCTURAL

APPROACH TO IMPROVING CULTURE IN
THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY

The traditional Russian nesting doll, or Matryoshka, provides a
helpful metaphor for visualizing the broader cultural dynamics in the financial services sector as a multi-layered, systemic phenomenon.102 The
existing literature focuses on two innermost layers of the system: the
101 See Williams & Conley, supra note 93, at 486.
102 See supra Part I.D.
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individual and the firm within which that individual is "contained."
There is an important logic to this broadening of the initial focus on
individual misbehavior as a mere "bad apple" problem to include the
broader organizational dynamics. People will always make unethical but
personally advantageous choices if their immediate environment-the
organizational "container"-either actively rewards or passively tolerates
that behavior.
An "apple barrel" is an obvious metaphor for the organizational
context in which human "bad apples" exist. 103 It does not, however, lend
itself easily to further enlargement of the analytical focus beyond the
organizational limits of a single firm. Yet, the latter is a necessary step in
our quest for understanding firm-level cultural dynamics: in real life, a
single firm is less like a self-contained barrel than a doll nested inside the
multi-doll Matryoshka system. Each doll inside that system may stand on
its own and sport a distinctive color and pattern, but its basic shape and
function are determined by reference to the organically interdependent
whole. It is this fundamental macro-structural unity that makes a colorful
wooden souvenir brought from foreign travels a helpful conceptual representation of today's financial universe.
In this Part, I will attempt to unpack this unconventional metaphor
and show how improving the presently dysfunctional risk culture of financial services firms requires a deep rethinking of, and changes in, the
basic structure and dynamics of the entire financial system - and, ultimately, the broader normative framework within which it operates.
A.

Firms in Institutional Context

As argued above, firms do not construct their organizational culture
purely from the ground up, as a combined product of their individual
employees' or managers' ethical values and attitudes. 10 4 A critically important source of firms' internal systems of norms, incentives, and behavioral patterns is the market in which these firms compete and the
industry which they collectively compose. Individual firms are not free
agents exercising their morally salient organizational choices in a vacuum; they are interconnected elements of a bigger whole-the market,
the industry, the system-and their individual choices and strategies reflect certain fundamentally collective choices and strategies. A financial
services firm continuously absorbs, processes, operationalizes, and hierarchically orders a multitude of norms, expectations, and incentives generated within the relevant market and the financial services industry as a
whole. Therefore, in order to understand-and, more importantly, to in103
104

See O'Toole & Bennis, supra note 2, at 4.
See supra Part II.
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fluence-the process of continuous production of shared norms, beliefs,
and attitudes toward risk-taking inside any individual financial services
firm, it is critical to understand the basic structure and operation of the
financial market, more generally.
A full analysis of the structure and operation of modem financial
market is beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the key
is to focus on the fundamental market dynamics that currently hinder the
emergence of a viable, internally sustained, other-regarding culture of
risk-taking in the financial services sector.
Let us start with the basics. The regulatory campaign to push financial services firms toward embracing more socially responsible norms of
prudent risk-taking and systemically beneficial self-restraint can succeed
only to the extent such a shift does not threaten an individual firm's ability to thrive in the existing business environment. It will simply not be
rational for a single firm to change its behavior and internal incentive
structure in ways that would diminish its competitive strength vis-A-vis
other firms in the market. Calling for this kind of unilateral disarmament,
even for the sake of improving the firm's organizational efficiency and
long-term performance potential, is not likely to yield practical results. 105
Even appealing to firms' economic self-interest, though arguably more
effective than appealing to abstract moral values, is not likely to deliver
the desired results in practice if it is focused primarily on what happens
06
within a single firm.'
Of course, the idea behind this campaign-and academic proposals-is to make all, or at least the critical mass of, financial services
firms to disarm simultaneously. Implicitly, it is assumed that what appeals to a single firm would be adopted independently and voluntarily by
every single firm, and that would automatically change the culture of the
industry as a whole. This, however, is a common fallacy of composition.
It ignores the fact that the whole is a product of complex interaction
among its constitutive elements and, therefore, is qualitatively different

from any individual element within it.107 While it is true that changing
105 See Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems:The Structure of Procyclicality in Financialand Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3
J. FIN. PERSP. 1, 10-12 (2015) [hereinafter, "Recursive Collective Action Problems"] (using
arms races and unilateral disarmament as classic examples that help to explain a broad range
of individually rational but collectively irrational dynamics in financial markets).
106 For a discussion of how pervasive appealing to individual firms' self-interest is in the
current discourse on risk culture in the financial sector, see supra Part EII.B.
107 The fallacy of composition is a concept rooted in the classic Aristotelian categorization of logical errors. For a helpful overview, see generally Hans Hansen, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Fallacies (Edward N. Zalta) (Fall 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/fallacies/#Ari. For a specific application of this concept to finance, see Bubbles, Busts,
and Blame, supra note 14, at 17 (arguing that to assume that asset price bubbles are incompatible with individual rationality is to commit a fallacy of composition). For a more comprehen-
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the culture of the financial services industry requires changing the culture
of the firms it comprises, the opposite is equally true. The latter cannot
be separated from the former.
In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, changing the prevailing industry-wide practices and attitudes toward systemically destabilizing risktaking is the key prerequisite for the firm-level cultural change. 10 8 The
million-or, perhaps more accurately, multi-trillion-dollar question is,
how to ensure the organic, endogenous development of such a new industry culture, or industry morality, in the realm of finance.
B.

From Endogenous to Exogenous: Industry Morality and Structural
Reform

The term "industry morality" denotes "a set of commonly accepted
industry-wide principles and practices that defines right conduct as it
spells out the industry's public commitment to moral restraint and aspiration." 10 9 It is a potentially powerful mechanism for re-orienting private
firms' business conduct toward goals other than their narrow economic
self-interest, such as the goal of preserving and enhancing systemic financial stability. A shared normative framework holding all industry participants to the same standard of other-regarding behavior would
function as a universal disarmament pact, enabling individual firms to
align their internal incentive structures with the public's interest in minimizing systemic financial risk. 1 10
Admittedly, there are few real-life examples of such other-regarding
industry morality successfully curbing undesirable externalization of risk
by profit-seeking private firms. Social scientists, for example, examined
the rise of consciously public risk-driven self-regulation schemes in the
nuclear energy and chemical manufacturing industries."' Whether these
industries succeeded in achieving that laudable goal is a matter of consive theoretical and historically-grounded post-crisis account of the importance of structural, as
opposed to individual or firm, incentives for financial risk-taking, see generally Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upperfor Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010); Bretton Woods 1.0: A
Constructive Retrievalfor Sustainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2013)
[hereinafter, "Bretton Woods 1.0"]; and Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note

105.
108 See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward FinancialIndustry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 431-38 (2011) [hereinafter, "Wall Street as Community of Fate"].
109 Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An InstitutionalPerspective, 19 LAW & POL'Y 363, 376 (1997).
110 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111 See Wall Street as Community of Fate, supra note 108, at 442-55 (describing the key
findings and criticisms of social science research on the nuclear energy and chemical manufacturing industries' efforts to protect the public from harm through industry-wide selfregulation).
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siderable doubt. 112 For our purposes, however, the importance of these
case studies is in understanding what factors make an industry-any industry-likely to take the critical first step toward that goal. What factors
are likely to force an industry to recognize the need to overcome its
short-term orientation and develop a new normative framework for conducting business in a more publicly beneficial manner?
Of course, there is no simple answer to this question: each industry's experience is uniquely complex and difficult to distill down to a
general recipe. Nevertheless, at the most basic level, the nuclear energy
and chemical manufacturing sectors' experiences reveal a critical causal
link. They show that the most powerful incentive for a private industry to
change its shared code of conduct is not some kind of mass moral revelation: it is the fear of regulatory shutdown in response to a politically
salient failure of the industry to protect the public from harmful consequences of its privately profitable activities. 113 In that sense, the rise of
an industry morality overtly proclaiming the industry's commitment to
protect innocent third parties from harm was a matter of pragmatic selfpreservation.
For example, the project of developing an explicitly public safetyoriented self-regulatory regime in the U.S. nuclear power sector began
after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, which made it face an existential threat of being shut down by the government.11 4 Despite its negligible impact on the environment or health of people outside the plant, the
incident caused a great deal of public outrage and fear, which in turn put
a lot of pressure on the federal government to protect the public by banning commercial nuclear power production. 1 15 Nuclear power companies' prohibitively high cost of physically relocating their operations to a
different jurisdiction made their perception of vulnerability particularly
acute. While a number of other factors-the degree of the industry's homogeneity, the ability of public interest groups to exert pressure on the
industry, or the existence of a strong industry leadership-played a role
in shaping this push to develop an industry morality in the nuclear power
sector, the undeniable key driver behind it was the threat of governmental prohibition of nuclear power production. 116 A fundamentally similar

112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See generally JOSEPH

REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION

OF

NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND (1994).

115 See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on the Three Mile
Island Incident, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle
.html#effects.
116 See Wall Street as Community of Fate, supra note 108, at 454.
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story unfolded in the chemical manufacturing sector in the wake of the
1 17
1984 Bhopal disaster that claimed thousands of lives.
The financial services industry, which has survived a truly global
systemic crisis, is unlikely to develop a similar sense of existential threat.
The events of 2008-2009 illustrate the degree to which the largest, most
complex financial institutions, responsible for generating the highest
risks to systemic stability, are not only immune to government retaliation-they are immune to failure precisely because the government will
not let them fail. In effect, systemically important financial firms are "too
big to fail" (TBTF). 1 8 A vast body of scholarly and popular literature is
devoted to examining the causes of, and the cures for, the TBTF phenomenon and the moral hazard it creates. 119 For purposes of the present
discussion, however, the key is to elucidate the intimate link between the
goal of encouraging the emergence of a systemic risk-conscious "industry morality" in the financial sector, on the one hand, and the need to
120
address the structural aspects of TBTF, on the other.
In other words, understanding the dynamics of an industry-wide
normative shift of the type needed to enable individual firms to change
their internal organizational norms and incentives-away from the powerful goal of maximizing short-term profitability and toward a more diffuse notion of safeguarding systemic stability-reveals the central
12 1
importance of structural reform in the financial services sector.
The range of potential options for such reform includes, for example, breaking up TBTF financial conglomerates into smaller, more specialized firms and imposing a size limit on financial institutions, in the
spirit of the traditional antitrust regulation.' 22 A complementary, though
conceptually distinct, measure is structural separation of the financial
117

Id. at 449-50.

118 The term "too big to fail" was originally used to refer to Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company, whose near-failure in 1984 threatened the stability of the U.S. banking industry. See History of the 80's-Lessons for the Future, 235-57 (vol. 1, 1997), available
at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
119 The post-crisis literature on the TBTF phenomenon is too vast and diverse to cite here,
especially since the concept is used in a wide variety of contexts and for a multitude of reasons. For a popularly written book-length account of how this phenomenon manifested itself
during the recent financial crisis, see generally ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG To FAr
(2010).
120 Thus, Professor Mark Roe persuasively argues that being TBTF corrupts financial
firms' corporate governance and organizational culture and incentivizes them to seek to abuse
the public subsidy rather than serve the real economy. Mark J. Roe, Structural Corporate
DegradationDue to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance, 162 U. PENN. L. Rav. 1419 (2014).
121

For an overview of the post-crisis attempts at structural reform in the financial sector,

see Saule T. Omarova, CentralBanks, Systemic Risk, and FinancialSector Structural Reform,

in

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING

(Rosa Lastra and Peter Conti-Brown, eds.)

(forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter, "CentralBanks, Systemic Risk"].
122 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An
Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to FinancialRegulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368 (2011); SIMON JOHN-
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services industry along various activity or product lines. While the most
commonly discussed versions of this approach include institutional separation of federally-insured deposit-taking from either investment banking12 3 or lending12 4 businesses, it is possible to envision other criteria for
125
redrawing regulatory boundaries.
In essence, these measures seek to restrain and condition firms' entry into specific markets for financial products and services, and to limit
both (1) the size and the range of permissible business activities of individual firms, and (2) the scope and distortive impact of public subsidy of
certain financial institutions. Both of these outcomes are designed to decrease the likelihood of individual firms pursuing socially harmful highstakes, high-risk business strategies. 12 6 Smaller, more specialized financial services firms are less likely to incur or create leverage and risk at
systemically unsustainable levels. Unlike mega-sized financial conglomerates, these smaller firms are not presumptively shielded from bankruptcy and are, therefore, more directly subject to healthy market
discipline. As a result, they are more likely to base their business strategies on relational and reputational factors, which fosters a more clientand customer-oriented, less short-term risk-driven culture.127 Put simply,
once no individual firm is "too big to fail," the industry as a whole is far
more likely to embrace collective self-restraint as a long-term survival
28
imperative. 1
SON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FiNANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010).

123 See Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
124 See, e.g., LAWRENCE KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD'S
ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING (2011); Adam Levitin, Safe

Banking, 83 U. Cm. L. REV. 357, 357 (2016); George Pennacchi, Narrow Banking, 4 ANN.
REV. OF FIN. EcoN. 1 (2012); Arthur J. Wilmarth, Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform that
Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial
Conglomerates, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL'y REP. 1 (2012).

125 See, e.g., Wall Street as Community of Fate, supra note 108, at 476-82. See also
Central Banks, Systemic Risk, supra note 121.
126 On the heightened propensity of large, diversified financial conglomerates to pursue
such high-risk, high return business strategies, see, e.g. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side
of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial
Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963, 964 (2009).
127 In fact, scholars writing on the ethics and culture of finance often recognize this general link between the industry's structure and its culture. See, e.g., Thakor, supra note 59, at 13
(arguing that older, smaller banks have a stronger internal culture); Davidoff et al., supra note
86, at 533 (stating that traditional, specialized investment banks pursued a relational business
model based on their reputational capital). See also ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007).

128 See Roe, supra note 120, at 1460; see also Davidoff et al., supra note 86, at 533.
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The key point here is not to advocate any specific proposal on its
merits but to outline the types of potential changes in the immediate institutional context in which individual financial services firms operate,
which would make such firms more likely to cultivate a more prudent
and socially responsible risk-taking culture. Any potential structural reform measure is bound to raise numerous objections, especially from the
financial industry, and face numerous design and implementation challenges. 129 From the perspective of cultural change, however, the ultimate
problem is that these reforms involve explicit government regulation, an
inherently exogenous factor vis-A-vis the culture of the firm. Just like
with every regulatory attempt to control private risk-taking in the financial sector, these reforms will inevitably encounter resistance and hostility from the financial services firms well-versed in the art of regulatory
arbitrage. 130 As a result of these familiar dynamics, drawing formal legal
and regulatory lines may potentially have a perverse practical effect of
creating even more destabilizing complexity and hidden risk in the finan31
cial system.'
To avoid that counterproductive outcome, it is important that private
financial institutions are somehow co-opted into accepting the reforms
likely to hurt their profitability. In other words, traditional top-down
structural reform of the financial sector, necessary for the emergence of
an industry-wide culture of prudent risk-taking, is itself unlikely to succeed without such a cultural shift.
This vicious "regulation-evasion" cycle is the key reason why private ordering is so often viewed as the most viable method of improving
the financial firms' risk culture. However, casting available policy alternatives in this rigidly binary way ignores the existence of a critically
important third choice on the menu of levers of cultural change: the use
of public power to alter the key financial market dynamics from within,
through direct participation in market transactions.

129 For a discussion of some of these challenges, see Central Banks, Systemic Risk, supra

note 121.
130 The literature on the nature and role of regulatory arbitrage in the financial services
sector is too voluminous to cite here. The rise of today's derivatives and repo markets, and the
growth of money market mutual funds, for example, were direct products of regulatory arbitrage and financial firms' desire to circumvent specific regulatory constraints on their activities. For a recent book-length account of these dynamics, see ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES,
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013).

131 See Central Banks, Systemic Risk, supra note 121 (summarizing the arguments to this
effect advanced by the opponents of structural reform in the financial sector).
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C. From Exogenous to Endogenous: Public Options and Market
Dynamics
As discussed above, regulatory restructuring of the financial industry can facilitate the emergence of a more public-minded risk culturean industry-wide disarmament pact-only indirectly, through the industry actors' collective decision-making. This renders the entire process
less transparent and more vulnerable to subversion by the hostile industry
actors. But the government could also affect each financial services
firm's risk-taking behavior-and, ultimately, attitudes-more directly,
by taking on the role of a market participant. By acting endogenously, as
a regular market actor, rather than exogenously, as a market regulator,
the government can target the fundamental market dynamics much more
effectively. It can also use its potentially transformative market-actor
tools to supplant and support the more traditional, top-down structural
reforms of the kind discussed above.
In previous work, my colleague Robert Hockett and I have argued
that public instrumentalities are uniquely capable of performing a wide
array of functions critical to the successful operation-and, indeed, very
survival-of the ostensibly private financial markets. 132 Public instrumentalities' unique built-in advantages-large size, access to public
funding, long-term investment horizon, legal and regulatory privilegesenable them to take on greater risk at times when no private market actor
is able to do so. 133 In that sense, public instrumentalities are "natural"
market contrarians whose presence is critical in order to resolve a particularly pernicious kind of the financial market dysfunction: recursive col134
lective action problems.
Financial markets are rife with recursive collective action
problems.1 3 5 Financial asset bubbles, fueled by short-term speculation
and followed by devastating busts, exemplify this phenomenon. While it
is individually rational for each firm to purchase assets during the bubble
phase and sell them during the bust phase, these mutually reinforcing,
individually rational decisions aggregate into collectively dysfunctional
outcomes.1 36 A vivid illustration of this pernicious dynamic comes from
132 For an in-depth treatment, including a taxonomy, of the government's market-actor
roles, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a
Developmental FinanceState, 93 WASH. U. L. REv. 103, 107 (2015) [hereinafter, Public Actors]; Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public" Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEoRsTIcAL INQUIRIES IN L. 53, 56 (2014).
133 See Public Actors, supra note 132, at 138.
134 See Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 107, at 107 (introducing and explaining the term);
and Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105, at 10 (detailing the shared structure
of all recursive collective action problems, demonstrating their ubiquity in financial markets,
and outlining the common form shared by their solutions).
135 Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105, at 1.
136 See id. at 17-22; Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 107 at 420-25.
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Charles Prince, then Citigroup's CEO, who famously compared the precrisis buildup of unsustainable risk and leverage in the financial sector to
the game of musical chairs.137 No single financial firm could "stop dancing" and exit that increasingly dangerous game until the entire game
came to a halting stop in the fall of 2008, just one year after Prince's
interview.

138

This framework is helpful for understanding-and creatively overcoming-the challenge of improving financial firms' dysfunctional culture of risk-taking. If we accept that cultivating a more prudent, socially
responsible, and systemically-oriented risk culture is in each firm's own
long-term economic interest, then the fact that no single firm can afford
to take this step unilaterally is a sign of serious collective irrationality.
Avoiding this collective irrationality necessarily requires coherent collective agency, exercised counter-cyclically. 139 In practice, only public in140
strumentalities are well-positioned to perform this critical function.
Accordingly, the solution has to come from a public instrumentality, acting to correct specific market-generated incentives for firms to continue
their collectively irrational behavior by making it also individually
14 1
irrational.
In other words, a truly meaningful and effective cultural shift in the
financial sector requires creation and proactive use of what may be called
"public options" in the financial marketplace. Without claiming to provide a detailed blueprint for action, it is possible to sketch out a general
approach to creating such public options. The essence of this approach is
deliberately using public instrumentalities to (1) target specific market
dynamics, and (2) act in ways that would render systemically risky behavior no longer individually rational for any private market participant.
For example, a major source of socially excessive risk in the financial system is credit-fueled, short-term speculative trading in secondary
markets. It is individually rational for private firms operating under
short-term performance pressure to engage in such speculative trading,
which creates socially destructive boom-bust financial cycles. 142 To
137 Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buyouts, FIN.
TIMEs (July 9, 2007), https://www.ft.com/content/8Oe2987a-2e50-1ldc-821c-0000779fd2ac
("[A]s long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing.").
138 Id.
139 See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105, at 23-32; Public Actors,
supra note 132 at 129-31.
140 See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105, at 24 ("Where the collectivity in question is, or is part of, a polity or some other aggregate of persons in whom the
attributes of sovereignty vest-that is, a state-the most common form of such agency is a
government or government instrumentality. In a state or other polity, government is the collective agent par excellence.").
141 See sources cited supra note 139.
142 Id. See also A Fixer-Upperfor Finance, supra note 107, at 1223-44.
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dampen the incentive for private firms to seek short-term speculative investment opportunities, a central bank-in the U.S., the Federal Reserve
System (the Fed)-could act as a countercyclical market-maker maintaining prices of certain systemically salient financial assets within a certain fundamentals-based range.143 The Fed already conducts this kind of
market-making with respect to U.S. Treasury bonds as part of its monetary policy. 144 Extending the logic of central bank trading to a broader
portfolio of financial assets prone to procyclical bubble-and-bust dynamics-corporate bonds and stocks, commodities, housing prices, etc.would fundamentally alter market participants' rational expectations with
respect to private profitability of procyclical investments. To preempt
speculative manias and panics in financial markets, the Fed would (1)
sell assets whose price movements indicate potential speculative bubbles,
thereby putting downward pressure on their prices, and (2) purchase assets whose price movements indicate potentially systemically destabilizing "fire-sale" dynamics, thereby putting a floor under the relevant
market. 145
Though the Fed's market-making actions would not aim explicitly
at financial firms' internal cultural norm production, they would drastically reshape the structure of external determinants of that process. In the
absence of systematic opportunities for reaping extraordinary gains from
short-term speculative trading, financial firms' competitive energies
would have to be redirected toward other, less systemically destabilizing,
business strategies. This system-wide shift in the structure of firms' incentives and activities would, in turn, form the basis for an endogenous
change in their risk culture, both at the level of individual entities and at
the level of the industry as a whole.
Another potentially effective method of changing financial firms'
internal risk culture would be to introduce an explicitly public elementa form of public option-directly into such firms' corporate governance
structure. For instance, it is possible to envision a special "golden share"
regime that would grant direct but conditional management rights to a
designated government representative on the board of each financial services firm.1 4 6 Under normal circumstances, the government appointee
143 See Public Actors, supra note 132, at 141-44.
144 More specifically, the Federal Open Market Committee periodically determines broad
monetary-policy targets based on the macroeconomic data at its disposal, and the FRBNY staff
devises and implements its trading strategy in line with these targets! See generally Permanent
Open Market Operations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
pomojlanding.html.
145 For a more detailed discussion of how the Fed would execute this strategy, see Public
Actors, supra note 132, at 141-44.
146 For a full exposition of this idea, see Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share" Approach, 68 ALA. L. REv. 1029 (2017).
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would function as a passive observer on the relevant firm's board of directors. However, upon the occurrence of specified triggering eventsincluding significant lapses in the firm's legal and regulatory compliance, troubling changes in its business strategy or overall risk appetite, or
signs of excessive build-up of leverage and risk in the financial system as
a whole-the "golden share" would shift into an active mode, and the
government representative would effectively assume the role of the
firm's "manager of last resort." 147 In that role, the government would be
able to take the speedy and effective action necessary to counteract socially harmful and thus irrational effects of pure market rationality. 1 48
Once the systemic danger subsides, the "golden share" would revert to its
passive state. 149
Again, the goal of this Article is not to defend the "golden share"
proposal-or, indeed, any substantive reform proposal-on its full merits but merely to illustrate how public instrumentalities can potentially
induce a fundamental endogenous change in the risk culture of individual
financial services firms. By radically reducing the opportunities for systemically destabilizing risk-taking behavior, these proposed changes in
key market dynamics or firms' corporate governance will fundamentally
alter the structural and normative context in which the firms' organizational culture and shared value systems are formed and continuously
regenerated. This distinct type of structural reform-through direct public participation in private markets and activities, rather than through exogenous regulation-potentially offers the most effective way of
achieving the desired, but persistently elusive, normative change in the
financial services industry.
D.

Rattling the Big Matryoshka: Where in the Structure a Normative
Shift Really Matters

There is little doubt that adopting an explicitly participatory marketactor approach to controlling systemic financial risk and incentivizing
socially beneficial cultural change in the financial sector, described
above, would represent a significant break with the existing philosophy
147 For a detailed discussion of the triggering events and the government's special management rights at the post-trigger stage, see id. at 1052-58.
148 The "golden share" regime would not merely replicate the existing system of regulatory oversight of financial services firms. By contrast, it will expand the range of potential
levers of systemic stabilization available to financial regulators. As an internal corporate actor,
the government will be able to use the mechanisms of internal corporate governance to make
necessary adjustments to individual firms' behavior in a far more flexible and timely fashion.
See id. at 1061-62.
149 Id. at 1055-57.
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of financial sector regulation.150 It is a known fact that government instrumentalities routinely transact in a wide array of ostensibly private
financial markets. 15 1 Yet, a full recognition and programmatic use of this
practice as a critical tool of public policy requires a fundamental rewiring
of the current discourse on the substance and methods of effective
macroprudential regulation of finance. At present, the scope of
macroprudential oversight is limited primarily to matters of capital adequacy, liquidity management, resolution regimes, and other similarly
technical aspects of financial firms' business operations. 152 Expanding
that domain to incorporate public instrumentalities' direct market activities, undertaken with an explicit view toward manipulating macro-level
dynamics, is a logical step forward-as well as a controversial one.
More generally, operationalizing a program of proactive and deliberate use by the government of its market-actor powers would require a
critical reassessment of the social purposes and functions of the financial
system and its constitutive components. Just like an individual's normative choices reflect that individual's interactions with the surrounding organizational culture (that of the firm), the financial system's normative
dynamics are fundamentally tied to, and reflect its interactions with, the
surrounding layer of the "real" economy. In this context, the financial
system's principal purposes and functions cannot be understood in purely
self-referential, transactional terms: they can only be determined by reference to the broader economy and society. 15 3 The "higher" purpose of
financial institutions, embedded in the social system, is not simply to
154
serve their clients' private interests but also to serve societal interests.
Accordingly, the normative scale on which to judge the functioning-or malfunctioning-of financial markets and institutions must be
expanded beyond the narrowly self-referential notions of "market efficiency" to encompass a broader view of social efficiency. A well-functioning-or "good"-financial system is one that continuously allocates
capital to productive non-financial enterprise and enables sustainable,
structurally balanced, and socially inclusive long-term growth of the real

150 See Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-FrankAct: A New Deal for A New Age?, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 83 (2011) [hereinafter, "A New Deal for A New Age?"] (analyzing the key

elements of the regulatory philosophy in the financial sector).
151 See generally sources cited supra note 132.
152 See generally sources cited supra note 3.
153 See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102
CORNELL L. REv. 1143 (2017) [hereinafter, "Finance Franchise"](offering a comprehensive
narrative of the modem financial system's function and relation to the broader economy and
polity).
154 See id. at 1212-15. For a discussion of the narrowly self-referential approach, see
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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economy. 155 Conversely, a malfunctioning-or "bad"-financial system
is one that continuously misallocates credit and money to unproductive
financial speculation, thereby undermining the real economy's capacity
for long-term growth. Explicitly articulating and endorsing these normative principles would significantly broaden the scope of public policy
choices and tools. It would provide a solid normative basis for adopting
more assertive macro-level, structural approaches to correcting the currently dysfunctional dynamics in the financial system, including the ap15 6
proaches discussed above.
An explicit incorporation of this systemic view of the purposes and
functions of finance, in turn, requires a fundamental rethinking of the
proper balance between public and private interests, capabilities, and
roles in the economy and, ultimately, polity. The currently dominant understanding, ideologically rooted in the tenets of neoliberalism, posits a
deep divide in the relative competencies of the state (public) and the
market (private).1 57 To put it simply, the neoliberal paradigm views the
economy as a quintessentially private realm and, accordingly, presumes
the normative primacy of private over public in the economic sphere. 15 8
Not only is this view descriptively misleading, but it is also normatively
indefensible: it serves as the ultimate basis for justifying and legitimizing
pursuit of private gain by private actors at any (or nearly any) social cost.
As discussed above, it is precisely this kind of skewed normative judgment that is at the heart of the present systemic dysfunction in modem
159
finance.
A radical redrawing of this conceptual boundary between public and
private is necessary in order to assert the normative primacy of the public
not only at the level of the polity but, importantly, at the level of the
economy-and every other level of the Matryoshka-like socio-cultural
system. 160 It means, in particular, that the public's interests, capabilities,
and roles should be fully acknowledged and deliberately prioritized in
155 For a full elaboration of this argument, see Public Actors, supra note 132; Robert C.
Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and PublicGoods: A Casefor a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2018).
156 See supra Part IV.B-C.
157 See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2015) (arguing that neoliberalism systematically puts capitalist market imperatives over democratic imperatives); Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the
Art of Separation, 12(3) POLMCAL THEORY 315 (Aug. 1984) (arguing that separation of the
public and private spheres is at the core of liberalism).
158 See Public Actors, supra note 132, at 113-14.
159 See A New Dealfor A New Age?, supra note 150, at 94-97 (arguing for the need to
overcome the deeply engrained normative bias in favor of protecting private actors' right to
pursue economic gain over the public's right to be protected from resulting economic harms).
160 See supra Part II.D. Of course, this is not meant as a blanket denial of individuals'
right to privacy, self-determination, or personal autonomy. The subject of this Article is specifically limited to the structure and dynamics of the system of norms and cultural attitudes
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system-and indithe operation, regulation, and culture of the financial
61
comprises.1
it
vidual financial services firms
In that sense, a fundamental normative and cultural change is, in
fact, the first-order priority on the financial sector reform agenda. That
change, however, has to start not at the level of individual bankers or
firms, the smallest pieces hidden inside the nesting doll, but at the highest level of a self-reflecting and self-constituting polity-the biggest Matryoshka that contains and carries the whole lot. That is where the most
important and urgently needed normative shift has to occur, if we are
serious about improving the ethics and culture of risk-taking in the financial sector.
CONCLUSION

This Article examined the principal themes in the newly reinvigorated public debate on the role of ethical norms and cultural factors in
reducing socially excessive levels of risk in modem financial markets.
The Article argued that the main conceptual and normative limitations of
the current discussions and proposed reform measures derive from their
exclusive focus on the organizational culture of an individual financial
services firm. To overcome these limitations, it is critical to shift the
focus away from the predominantly individual entity-level analysis toward the broader systemic aspects of modem finance.
The Article further argued that improving the presently dysfunctional risk culture of financial services firms requires a deep rethinking
of, and changes in, the basic structure and dynamics of the entire financial system-and, ultimately, the broader normative framework within
which it operates. How "ethical" or "unethical" the financial industry's
conduct or shared norms are is an issue inextricably linked to the broader
question of how effective or ineffective the financial system is in discharging its basic social function. As one observer put it,
Finance has become the tail that wags the dog. Until we start talking about how to create a financial system
that really serves society, rather than just trying to stay
ahead of the misdeeds of one that doesn't, we'll struggle

underwriting the currently pervasive pattern of socially excessive risk-taking in the financial
sector. That is the "system" to which I refer here.
161 See Finance Franchise, supra note 153 (redefining the basic narrative of modern finance as a public-private franchise arrangement, in which the public acts as the franchisor
effectively licensing private financial institutions to dispense a vital public resource, the sovereign public's full faith and credit).

2018]

ETHICAL FINANCE

in vain to bridge the gap between Wall Street and Main
Street. 162
The real problem with Wall Street's culture, therefore, is much
more fundamental than simply "wrong" compensation practices or "tone
from the top" at individual banks. Until we find the right structural
means of preventing excessive generation and accumulation of systemic
financial risk on a macro-level, we will search in vain for plausible
means of fostering a socially responsible risk culture in the financial sector. In the final analysis, the key to making modem finance ethically
sound is to make it structurally sound, and vice versa.

162 Rana Foroohar, How Big Banks Became Our Masters, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/how-big-banks-became-our-masters.html.

